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Electoral	systems	help	explain	why	left-wing
governments	(sometimes)	tax	the	poor
Using	novel	historical	data,	Per	F.	Andersson	demonstrates	that	left-wing	governments	tax
more	regressively	in	proportional	representation	systems	and	more	progressively	in	majoritarian
ones.	He	illustrates	how	political	risk	shapes	the	strategies	of	key	actors	and	helps	explain	the
divergence	in	tax	policy	using	the	examples	of	Swedish	and	British	tax	policy	after	1945.	
We	like	to	believe	that	our	political	choices	matter,	that	it	makes	a	difference	whether	the
government	is	run	by	the	right	or	the	left.	Yet	researchers	have	found	that	the	link	between
partisanship	and	policy	is	surprisingly	weak,	and	some	even	find	that	left-wing	governments	are
associated	with	heavier	taxation	of	the	poor.	In	a	new	paper,	I	argue	that	whether	the	left	taxes	regressively	or
progressively	depends	on	the	institutional	context,	not	–	as	has	been	the	common	explanation	–	on	constraints	from
unions	or	rising	expenditures.	Drawing	on	a	unique,	cross-country	database	of	historical	tax	revenues	and	archival
material	from	the	UK	and	Sweden,	I	find	that	it	is	the	electoral	system	that	affects	how	left-wing	governments	make
tax	policy.
The	cross-country	analysis	reveals	that	the	left	relies	more	on	consumption	tax	in	proportional	representation	(PR)
systems	and	more	on	income	tax	in	majoritarian	systems.	The	figure	below	shows	the	average	share	of
government	revenue	from	consumption	and	income	taxes	in	a	sample	of	24	democratic	left-wing	governments	from
1900	to	2012	(the	dataset	can	be	accessed	here.)
The	same	pattern	appears	when	looking	at	the	introduction	of	taxes:	historically,	there	were	only	five	instances	of	a
personal	income	tax	(which	is	generally	progressive)	being	introduced	by	a	left-wing	head	of	government,	and	all	of
those	occurred	in	majoritarian	countries.	In	contrast,	among	the	six	left-wing	introductions	of	a	general	sales	tax	(the
precursor	of	value-added	tax,	VAT),	four	were	in	PR	systems.	The	pattern	is	the	same	for	VAT,	where	six	out	of	the
eight	left-wing	introductions	occurred	under	PR.
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What’s	behind	this	difference	in	left-wing	tax	policy?	I	argue	that	the	left	uses	different	strategies	for	redistribution.
One	is	to	use	progressive	taxation	to	reduce	inequality,	another	is	to	focus	on	revenue	maximization	and
redistribute	through	generous	transfers.	The	second	strategy	has	more	potential	for	reducing	inequality	but	is	riskier
politically	since	it	involves	compensating	for	the	regressive	impact	of	tax	policy	with	progressive	spending.
Where	political	power	is	concentrated	–	as	in	majoritarian	systems	–	the	risks	associated	with	losing	office	are
greater,	and	the	left	chooses	the	less	effective	but	safer	strategy	of	progressive	taxation	of	income.	In	systems	with
greater	opposition	influence	–	as	in	PR	systems	–	the	risk	of	combining	high-yield	regressive	taxes	with	progressive
spending	is	lower	since	compensatory	spending	can	be	protected.
Broad-based	consumption	taxes	–	such	as	VAT	–	are	efficient,	generate	a	lot	of	revenue,	and	are	harder	to	avoid.
However,	since	the	poor	consume	a	larger	share	of	their	income,	they	are	disproportionately	hurt	by	these	taxes.	As
such,	consumption	taxation	presents	left-wing	governments	with	a	dilemma:	it	is	a	formidable	tool	for	expanding	the
welfare	state,	but	at	the	same	time	it	hurts	the	very	groups	the	left	seeks	to	help.
In	the	post-war	era,	the	left	in	Britain	and	Sweden	faced	exactly	this	dilemma.	Both	the	Swedish	Social	Democrats
and	the	British	Labour	Party	recognised	that	reducing	inequality	could	be	achieved	by	combining	an	efficient,	high-
revenue	tax	system	with	targeted	spending	programs.	For	instance,	prominent	Labour	politician	Anthony	Crosland
held	that	socialist	taxes	should	not	exclude	high-yielding	consumption	taxes.	Similarly,	key	individuals	within	the
Swedish	labour	movement	argued	that	judging	indirect	taxes	only	on	its	incidence	and	not	on	what	the	revenue	was
used	for	was	like	throwing	the	baby	out	with	the	bathwater.	So,	not	only	did	both	parties	seek	to	reduce	inequality,
but	they	also	agreed	that	a	broad-based	consumption	tax	could	help	reach	that	goal.
Why	did	the	left	implement	this	idea	in	Sweden	but	not	in	Britain?	How	left-wing	governments	deal	with	this	dilemma
depends	on	political	institutions.	The	British	electoral	system	ensured	that	Labour	could	win	a	record	number	of
votes,	yet	still	be	short	of	a	majority	in	parliament.	For	instance,	in	1951,	Labour	won	48.8%	of	the	vote,	but	these
resulted	in	295	seats;	the	Conservatives’	48	%	of	the	vote	resulted	in	321	seats.	Labour	could	never	be	certain
about	its	future	power;	even	if	it	gained	votes,	it	could	still	be	defeated.	Moreover,	defeat	meant	losing	to	a	unified
right-wing	party	which	would	be	able	to	dictate	policy	without	any	opposition	influence.	In	other	words,	when	Labour
set	tax	policy,	it	did	so	knowing	that	the	future	was	uncertain.
This	uncertainty	affected	the	way	key	actors	on	the	British	left	thought	about	tax	policy.	The	Trade	Union	Congress,
for	instance,	was	worried	about	the	future	compensation	for	a	regressive	consumption	tax.	It	was	not	willing	to	risk
supporting	a	tax	that	would	hurt	the	poor,	while	being	unable	to	control	how	that	revenue	was	spent.	This	insecurity
and	volatility	associated	with	the	winner-take-all	system	made	Labour	prefer	a	safer	–	but	less	efficient	–	tax
strategy.	Labour’s	fear	turned	out	to	be	true:	when	the	Tories	introduced	VAT	in	1973,	they	did	so	without
compensatory	spending.
In	Sweden,	the	more	predictable	political	system	made	it	possible	to	reform	the	tax	system	and	compensate	the
poor	at	the	same	time.	The	Social	Democrats	introduced	an	efficient	consumption	tax	–	despite	opposition	from
trade	unions	–	confident	that	they	were	able	to	ensure	compensatory	welfare	spending	in	the	future.	This
confidence	stemmed	from	a	proportional	electoral	system	ensuring	predictable	results	and	substantial	opposition
influence.	Moreover,	a	fragmented	right	reduced	the	risks	associated	with	losing	power,	and	further	increased
opposition	leverage.	The	strategy	of	combining	consumption	tax	with	an	expansion	of	welfare	programs	was
successful,	both	in	fighting	poverty	and	in	winning	votes;	after	the	reform,	the	Social	Democrats	were	able	to	push
down	the	poverty	rate	while	also	gaining	seats	in	the	following	election.
The	puzzling	relationship	between	ideology	and	tax	policy	is	not	so	puzzling	once	political	institutions	are	taken	into
account.	Left-wing	governments	choose	different	strategies	for	redistribution	depending	on	the	political
environment.	This	idea	is	consistent	with	the	experiences	of	Britain	and	Sweden	in	the	decades	after	the	Second
World	War,	and	also	with	quantitative	evidence	from	a	global	historical	sample.
__________________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	Comparative	Politics;	a	free	version	of	the	paper	is
available	here.
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